Abstract: Electronic market places have the function of coordinating the supply and demand in the World Wide Web (WWW) on a central platform. This coordination service is frequently offered by a central operator (the so-called market operator), who actively intervenes in the market as an organiser or broker. The operator collects the bids and asks in a database and orders them according to a specific coordination mechanism (the so-called matching). This paper analyses the coordination function (concretely reflected in the matching function) of an electronic market place according to the aspects of competition. The result of the analysis is a matching function. Using this function, we can determine the 'strength of competition' of an electronic market place as measured by the probability of the successful mapping between supply and demand.
Introduction
The purpose of electronic market places is to coordinate the supply and demand in the World Wide Web (WWW) on a central platform (Malone et al., 1987; Schmitz, 2000) . This coordination is frequently offered as a service by a central broker who actively intervenes in the market, the so-called market operator (Bailey and Bakos, 1997) . In doing so, the broker collects the bids and asks (i.e., offers to buy or sell) in a database and matches them according to a certain coordination mechanism, the so-called matching function (Chircu and Kauffman, 1999) . This coordination service between the supply and demand is offered as an entrepreneurial product. The results are online auctions or virtual commodity exchanges, which coordinate specific commodities in the business-to-consumer or business-to-business area. One of the market operator's key aspects is determining and designing the matching function for his coordination services. This function should enable a high degree of overlap between bids and asks (Whinston et al., 1997) .
Market place operators are independent entrepreneurs who increasingly compete with each other. They strive to win customers for their own coordination platform. They continually seek for suppliers and demanders who are willing to pay for the coordination services they perform (Kollmann, 2001) . To date, the literature has covered the general effects on economic transactions concerning the phenomenon of 'electronic market places' (Bakos, 1998; Lee, 1998; Lee and Clark, 1996) . The growing number of such market places, however, has placed the aspect of competition between the market operators more into focus. Today, stiff competition can already be observed in many segments.
The goal of this paper is to analyse the competition between operators of electronic market places and to examine the corresponding coordination service. The results are used to determine a concrete matching function, which can then be used to determine the strength of competition (i.e., the probability of successfully mapping bids and asks) on an electronic market place. We will then apply the function to a simulated data set of bids and asks for an electronic market place for used cars.
The coordination service as competition factor
Operators of electronic market places provide a coordination service (Sarkar et al., 1998) . Since this coordination service occurs exclusively on the World Wide Web, it is not possible to explore physically the commodity on electronic markets. The focus is therefore on the 'information level' upon which the electronic matching of the digital data representing bids and asks takes place. A bidder (seller) provides information concerning his transaction object directly to the market operator's database via interactive input modules. Subsequently, the asker (buyer) may either pull down the information independently from the database or store his transaction wishes and have the market operator look for a transaction partner over a certain period of time. The operator then presents those objects which meet the criteria of the submitted transaction wishes either immediately or within a certain time period. All of these actions hinge simply and solely on the digital information, which describes the real transaction object. Hence, these actions are initially independent of the real object. The goal is to enable an appropriate mapping between bids and asks using both qualitatively high data and a good matching function (Strader and Shaw, 2000) .
The profit the operator earns thus depends concretely on the matching function. He will only get paid when he succeeds in matching the bid and ask. On the one hand, this matching reflects the market transparency that is achieved for the askers (buyers). On the other hand, it reflects the efficient coordination of objects for the bidders (sellers). The buyer finds numerous offers to buy (bids) at one place and profits from lower costs in looking for bids. He also saves time by avoiding unnecessary object inspections as he can interactively pre-select out of a detailed set of bids. Finally, he receives additional alternative proposals from the market operator that correspond to his original wishes. The electronic coordination allows the seller to market his products faster and less costly (Wigand and Benjamin, 1996) . First, he encounters a concentrated pool of asks. Second, he avoids classical scattering losses due to the fact that the market operator selects the pool of asks. It is presumable that the market operator's revenues will no longer consist solely of fixed database fees but mainly come from fees paid by market place users for successfully coordinating bids and asks. This implies that the matching function, as a result of a comparison between bids and asks, gains particular importance.
If the economical success of an electronic market place depends on the design of the matching function, then the question emerges "What are the determinants of a successful coordination between transaction partners?" First of all, it is clear that the simplicity of participating in electronic market places may lead to continuous fluctuations with respect to the number of bids and asks. Even though there may be a constant influx of new participants entering, old participants may be leaving the market place. Thus, the market place can experience both a growth and a shrinking process as well at each point in time. Due to the fluctuations of sellers (bidders) and buyers (askers) on the electronic market places, there is some time-varying leeway for the market operator. We obtain two competition factors for the matching function on electronic market places:
• The quantitative competition factor: 'number of participants'
The strength of a market place is mainly determined by the number of participants and the amount of the submitted bids and asks. These quantitative variables are indicators of the general leeway of coordinating trading partners (basis of the matching function). It is important to consider the fact that the numbers of bids and asks do coincide approximately since some transaction wishes cannot be satisfied for either the excess demand or the excess supply (Kollmann, 2001 ).
• The qualitative competition factor: 'degree of coincidence'
The sheer number of market participants does not allow a judgment of the quality of coordination. For example, the interpretation of the characteristics of a real estate object can differ significantly for both sides of the market. Thus, the extent to which the initial wishes do coincide with the coordination result of the market operator is important (design of the matching function). The degree of coincidence reflects, accordingly, the quality of matching the offered characteristics of the supply side (bidder) with the required characteristics of the demand side (asker). In doing so, the market operator may, for example, try to either reach 100% of the coordination quality or achieve 80% of matching results.
Ideally, demand and supply match each other in terms of all specifications for all transactions to match quantitatively and qualitatively. If this is the ideal scenario, then the market place has to produce an optimal coordination performance and, consequently, also achieve a good position competitively among rivaling platforms. Thus, it is elementary for a market operator to find the optimal coordination mechanisms in order to calculate the probability for a successful coordination between bids and asks.
Design of the matching function as the basis of coordination

A numerical optimisation approach
In order to maximise revenue from fees paid by market place users, the market operator needs to match as many appropriate transactions as possible with the highest degree of certainty. The starting point is a certain amount of transaction requests from suppliers and demanders, which are to be matched. This means that the central focus, in terms of coordination, is placed explicitly on formulating and solving a planning problem. In the considerations to come, we will think of the market operator as the actor who intermediates between bids and asks of heterogeneous physical goods. The practical example we have chosen deals with used passenger cars.
On the qualitative side (competition factor 'degree of coincidence'; compare with Section 2), the characteristics of the goods offered are determined by a vector of dimension n where n is a positive natural number. Thus, the measure of quality of a good consists of n different components. For example, the following components would be conceivable for a car: car type, chassis and motor power, year of construction, price, location, mileage, condition, optional equipment and colour. For the matter of simplification we assume that the seller of the car correctly states this quality vector so that the market operator has no reason to doubt this information. The quality vector has thus a dimension of ten. It is notable though that no component of the quality vector is numerically measurable (e.g., car type, chassis, colour). Therefore, such qualitative characteristics must first be quantified for reasons that will become clear later on. This quantification is achieved by mapping single numbers to specific realisations of the single components of the quality vector. For example, the component 'car type' could be quantified as follows: lower class ≅ 0; lower middle class ≅ 1; upper middle class ≅ 2; and upper class ≅ 3. The component 'colour' could be quantified with each colour as a binary variable and then matching of colours etc. could be performed. The result of quantifying it this way always produces an n-dimensional vector of numerical entries, which uniquely describes the quality of the product offered.
On the quantitative side (competition factor 'number of participants'; compare Section 2), the market operator collects all l offers (asks) and all m bids for the same product, where l and m are positive natural numbers that must not coincide. Hence, the market operator possesses l different quality vectors of offers and m such vectors of bids.
The central question is now as follows: "Which offer vector should be mapped to an appropriate bid vector?" The market operator, being an entrepreneur and acting in his own best interests, pursues the target of maximising his revenues. This will only be achieved if mappings that are found lead to as many successful exchanges as possible.
After that, the market operator can charge a coordination fee G, which we assume to be constant for the sake of simplicity. Given this background we may postulate the following target function for the market operator:
p ij denotes the probability that the coordination of offer i and bid j finally leads to an exchange (i.e., a successful transaction). G p ij characterises the probability-weighted coordination fee which the market operator receives by mapping offer i to bid j. The x ij is a binary variable which can only attain values of 0 and 1. The value 0 means 'no mapping' and 1 means 'mapping'. In order to solve (1) we need to ask the following questions:
1 How should probability p ij be modelled?
2 Which constraints are the binary variables x ij subject to?
Concerning the first question, we propose that the probability for a successful transaction depends on 'how great the distance is' between a bid and an ask vector in a well defined sense. This is due to the fact that if a car owner offers a car that deviates considerably in many quality components from the desired quality of a demander, then the probability of a successful transaction will be extremely low.
Since we have introduced the quality vector such that each vector component is measured by a numerical value, it is obvious to use the standard metric measure of vector space. The Euclidean distance is used, which is the straight line distance between two points. For example, in a plane with p 1 at (x 1 , y 1 ) and p 2 at (x 2 , y 2 ), it is √((x 1 -x 2 )² + (y 1 -y 2 )²)). It measures the distance as the sum over the squared differences between the single components. Increasing differences in single components therefore affect the probability of a successful transaction negatively. However, so far we have not mentioned the importance of the single components. If we applied the Euclidean distance without considering this aspect, we would implicitly assume that each component is equally important. Since the single components are likely to have a different impact (and hence different weights) concerning the probability function (in order to remain as general as possible), we specify the probability function as follows:
The q ik denotes the component k of the offer vector i. The q jk addresses component k of ask vector j. The a k is the weighting of the respective components (a 0 being a constant). The f(..) describes the so-called kernel of the probability function (Note: The Kernel Method (KM) is widely used for density estimation.). The essence of the method is that we draw a non-negative kernel function around each observation to estimate the unknown PDF. Since we neither know nor are able to observe how the probability function f(..) looks like given arbitrary transactions in the past (Note: we can only observe whether there actually was a successful transaction), we cannot estimate this function directly. We, therefore, have to assume some functional form for f(..). In order to get a sound probability function, we need to choose a kernel so as to assure that p ij is never bigger than 1, smaller than 0 and monotone. These are standard features of probability distributions. One option that fulfils these requirements is to choose the following so-called logistic form:
Now, the probability function p ij is supplemented as follows:
This approach is known as the so-called logit approach (although the logit and normal kernels appear to be the default choice functions sometimes). It is discussed in great detail in the standard econometric literature on binary decision problems and multiple choices (see Greene, 2003, section 21.5 and 21.7 etc.) . The next question concerns the problem of how to derive the numerical values for the coefficients a k (k = 0,…, n). Assuming there is a historical data set of r mappings y i (i = 1,..., r) between different offers and requests covering the realisations of all independent variables (i.e., the components of all quality vectors of offers and requests) and dependent variables (i.e., the binary variable exchange with value 1 for successful transaction or 0 for no successful transaction), then we can estimate the parameter a k of (4) as follows (Greene, 1997) . If we write down the probability P(..) that among r historical transactions Y 1 , ... Y r either a successful transaction has happened (y r = 1) or not (y r = 0). If we consider these transactions to be independent of each other, then we can express the total probability as a product of the single probabilities as follows: 
Here, we use the somewhat different notation, q ik = value of component k of the offer vector of historical coordination i. The tilde denotes the ask vector. Assuming L is the natural logarithm of probability P(..), we finally end up with a much simpler representation:
Maximising this logarithm of the probability, and thus the original probability P(..) since the logarithm of a function has the same optima as the function itself due to its monotony property, we get the following system of n + 1 algebraic equations with regards to a k :
where 2 ( ) 1 0
Given some technical conditions that are usually unproblematic, system (7) has a unique solution, but this cannot be solved explicitly. In order to estimate the parameters a k , it is therefore useful to either solve the system of Equation (7) using a numerical equation solver or to treat one of the optimisation problems (5) or, respectively, (6) with a numerical optimisation tool (compare Judd, 1998; Press et al., 1992) . For example, having access to MATLAB solver makes it easier to numerically solve optimisation problem (5) instead of equation system (7). The solution then determines our probability function completely.
Concerning the second question (i.e., how the binary variables x ij should be constrained) we propose the following. First, imagine a l × m matrix that contains the variables x ij . As soon as one element of this matrix is occupied with one, the respective offer will be mapped to the respective ask. For example, x 23 = 1 means that the second offer will be mapped to the third ask. This implies that neither the offer two nor the ask three can be used for further mappings so that all further matrix entries in row two and column three need to be set to 0. As a result, each row and each column can have, at most, one in all its entries. It is easily verifiable that, for an identical number of bids and asks, there is exactly one 1 in each column and each row. If the number of asks differ from the number of bids, then there will be, for obvious reasons, either columns or rows with zero entries only.
Using (4) and considering the constraints just discussed on the sum of the rows and the columns of the matrix of mappings x ij , we achieve the final optimisation problem: 
The optimisation problem (8) is a binary linear program (compare Hillier and Lieberman, 1995) . For our purposes, it will be sufficient to put problem (8) together with the prior logit estimation into a spreadsheet such as MATLAB and solve it with the tools this application provides. As soon as the planning problem of the market operator attains realistic magnitudes (e.g., for more than 14 bids and asks) it becomes evident that Excel can no longer handle these calculations. For good reason, we use MATLAB. One should then either turn to some standard numerical solution package (listed in http://gams.nist.gov/ for example) or develop one's own implementation in an efficient programming environment.
Example of simulating a coordination situation
Having discussed the optimisation problem of a market operator extensively in the last section, we now want to illustrate the different solution steps using an example. For this purpose, we restrict the quality vector to five components: motor power, year of construction, price, mileage and condition. Sampling the largest European market place for used cars 'AutoScout24' (ca. 800,000 bids and around 400,000 potential buyers) 1 we acquired the following information on ten historical mappings of bids (data outside parentheses) and asks (data within parentheses).
The possible realisations for the quality component 'condition' range from 1: very good; 2: good; 3: minor shortcomings; and up to 4: accident car.
Assigning coefficients a 1 to a 5 to the five components (from 'motor power' to 'condition') in Table 1 from left to right, considering a constant term a 0 , calculating the quadratic distances and subsequently maximising (5) or (6) 
Using this probability function, we can compute the unobservable transaction probabilities of the historical mappings given our model. We obtain the following. As one can plainly see, estimating our chosen probability function implies that the respective probability was almost one in all cases where successful transactions occurred. In contrast, for those cases where no successful transaction occurred the respective probability was close to zero. Thus, our chosen approach seems to be acceptable as it is able to sharply distinguish between successful and unsuccessful transactions.
Equipped with the estimated probability function (9), we can now illustrate the coordination problem (8) of the market operator given the following fictitious market situation. Using these structural data, we calculate the following table of associated exchange probabilities, where 'A' stands for ask and 'B' for bid. One optimal solution is lightly shaded. This is not the only solution, however. For example, we can also assign ask number 8 to bid number 9 and bid number 5 to ask number 4 (darkly shaded). The other assignments remain unchanged. The expected revenues of the market operator would be 9·G in both cases. It is clear that these solutions are optimal since bid number 4 always leads to a zero probability regardless of which ask is assigned to it. Hence, the best case for the market operator happens when all assignments produce successful transactions, in our case 9·G.
Table 4
Theoretical probabilities for all possible mappings Apart from that, a general word of caution must be given here. When using a numerical solution tool like MATLAB or GAUSS Solver, one should be careful since the final solution the program generates usually depends on the starting point. This is due to the fact that the solution algorithm (here Levenberg-Marquardt) employs only local information like the gradient. Thus, it does not find global solutions from any arbitrary starting point. Modern global optimisation algorithms, such as genetic algorithms simulated annealing or AGS-methods (Adapted Grid Search), help overcome this problem. However, as they are not very common at the moment, they usually need to be programmed demanding additional effort.
Consequences for operators of electronic market places
An intelligently designed matching function is crucial for market operators when it comes to competition between electronic market places. This matching function, the connection between quantitative and qualitative competition characteristics, can be considered the central control instrument. The related mathematical descriptions presented above clearly show that the market operator has to take special care when dealing with the following issues on the input side:
• Equilibrium between bids and asks; in order to increase the probability that all bids and asks can be successfully assigned.
• Equilibrium of bids and asks with the same quality characteristics (database of homogenous groups of segments such as concentration on the mediation of convertible automobiles).
• Superior matching at certain dates when these equilibrium criteria have been achieved (Note: a continuous assignment reducing the number of mediation alternatives also reduces the leeway for combinations).
On the output side, the following items could be helpful for a market operator based upon our argumentation:
• A probability function like (9) provides market operators an instrument to evaluate the economic success of their marketplace by allowing them to calculate expected revenues.
• With a probability function such as (9), market operators can analyse the product portfolio of their market place with regard to how easily objects can be mediated or not.
• A probability function like (9) helps compute the potential transaction ratio. A market operator can then use this ratio for marketing purposes (e.g., 'A transaction partner will be found on this market place with x% probability').
Finally, a probability function such as function (9) can also be used as a superior and neutral competition instrument to evaluate the performance of electronic market places in comparison to one another. The resulting probability functions for the assignment of bids and asks among different platforms make it possible to derive a good coordination performance of a market operator with high realisations of this probability function and vice versa. An important task for future research would be to carry out such a comparison on different electronic market places in various sectors.
A scrutiny for 'electronic market places for used cars' shows that the aspects concerning the input side have often not yet been fully realised (Kollmann, 2001) . Presently, the bid/ask ratio is about '1 is to 6'. With this ratio, not all asks can be satisfied with the consequence that the market place will lose demand. An equilibrium regarding the quality has also not yet been achieved since one can find rather low-quality cars that are offered because these market places seem to be the last chance for their owners to get rid off them. Moreover, many market places work according to the do-it-yourself motto, which means that the asker (buyer) is always looking for a bid himself without the intervention the market operator. This makes matching with a superior optimisation criterion impossible. Of course, buyers choose cars where there is a 100% coincidence that their interesting car characteristics match. Still, it is possible that a coincidence of 'only' 80% would also have led to a successful transaction. This, however, prevents satisfying other buyers' preferences. Thus, operators of electronic market places are recommended to collect bids and asks over a certain time range and to publish the results at a certain point in time (e.g., once a day or week). However, without such superior control and without using the information advantage associated with it, one must assume that other forms of intelligent internet search agents (who evaluate content and not only keywords) could outperform electronic market places. Then, the chance of approaching the ideal world of perfect competition markets in practice would be lost.
